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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintifi/Appellee, 
V. 
JAMES C. QUADA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Priority No. 2 
Case No. 950076-CA 
REPLY OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLEE TAKES NO POSITION AS TO COUNT I 
The Appellee takes no position as to Count I regarding Gary Kummer. The State wrongly 
states that the Defendant was convicted of two counts for "shooting twice at Bridger Kummer." 
(Brief of Appellee at 1) The juiy was given instructions regarding two counts of Aggravated Assault. 
(R. at 184, 185)(Jury Instructions 3 and 4). Count I dealt with Aggravated Assault against Gary 
Kummer. Count II dealt with Aggravated Assault against Bridger Kummer. In closing arguments, 
Ms. Laycock, the Utah County Deputy Attorney who tried this case, referred to both counts 
separately. (R. at 458) She also referred to jury instructions 3 and 4, pointing out that the different 
counts were based on actions against two separate people—Gary Kummer and Bridger Kummer. (R. 
at 458). As the State takes no position as to Count I, this Court should adopt the reasoning of the 
Appellant and rule that Count I should be dismissed. 
POINT n 
THERE IS NO BASIS IN GRAMMAR OR LOGIC FOR THE STATE'S CONCLUSION 
THAT THE WORDS "ACTOR'S STANDPOINT" IN JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
MEANS THE ORDINARY PERSON'S STANDPOINT. 
The jury instructions stated that recklessness is defined as: "[t]he [substantial and unjustifiable 
risk] must be of such nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from 
the actor's standpoint." (R. 180) (emphasis added). The State attempts to dismiss the Defendant's 
marshalling of the evidence as a grammatical misreading. Brief of Appellee at 17, n. 5. There is no 
basis in grammar or logic for the State's interpretation. A clear and plain reading of the jury 
instructions shows that the circumstances must be viewed from the Appellant's (the actor's) 
standpoint. To accept the State's reading of the instruction would pervert the plain meaning of the 
word "actor." The only alleged actor in this case was Mr. Quada. To read the instruction as the 
State chooses, would have the jury viewing the actions of a hypothetical person. It is clear that this 
trial involves a real person and not a hypothetical person. The plain reading of the instruction clearly 
means that the jury should look at the facts from the Mr. Quada's standpoint and then determine if 
the Mr. Quada's actions constituted "a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise." In order for the jury to have convicted Mr. Quada, it at least had to find 
that he acted recklessly; the reckless standard requires that the facts be viewed from Mr. Quada's 
standpoint. Therefore, in order to marshall the evidence in support of the jury's verdict, it must 
necessarily follow that the facts must be marshalled as seen from the actor's standpoint. Therefore, 
this Court should review the facts as marshalled by the Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
The State fails to address Count I regarding Gary Kummer. Consequently, Count I should 
be dismissed based on the reasoning stated in the Appellant's brief. The clear and plain reading of 
Jury Instruction No. 8 required that the evidence be marshalled from Mr. Quada's (the actor's) 
standpoint. Therefore, the Court should review the facts as marshalled by the Appellant. 
Dated this 5th day of February, 1996. 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
THOMAS H. MEANS 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated, §76-5-103 
199 CRIMINAL CODE 
76-5-102.6. Assault on a correctional officer. 
Any prisoner who throws or otherwise propels fecal material 
or any other substance or object at a peace or correctional 
officer is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 1994 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits 
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to an-
other; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of 
Subsection (lXa), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (lXa) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (lXb) is a third degree felony. 
1996 
76-5-103.5. Aggravated assault by prisoner. 
(1) Any prisoner, not serving a sentence for a felony of the 
first degree,' who commits aggravated assault is guilty of a 
felony of the second degree. 
(2) Any prisoner serving a sentence for a felony of the first 
degree who commits aggravated assault is guilty of: 
(a) a felony of the first degree if no serious bodily injury 
was caused; or 
(b) a capital felony if serious bodily injury was inten-
tionally caused. 1974 
76-5-104. Consensual altercation no defense to homi-
cide or assault if dangerous weapon used. 
In any prosecution for criminal homicide under Part 2 of 
this chapter or assault, it is no defense to the prosecution that 
the defendant was a party to any duel, mutual combat, or 
other consensual altercation if during the course of the duel, 
combat, or altercation any dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601 was used. its* 
76-5-105. Mayhem. 
[(1)] Every person who unlawfully and intentionally de-
prives a human being of a member of his body, or disables or 
renders it useless, or who cuts out or disables the tongue, puts 
out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of mayhem. 
(2) Mayhem is a felony of the second degree. 1973 
76-5-106. Harassment. 
( D A person is guilty of harassment if, with intent to 
frighten or harass another, he communicates a written or 
recorded threat to commit any violent felony. 
(2) Harassment is a class B misdemeanor. 1995 
76-5-106.5. Definitions — Crime of stalking. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining 
a visual or physical proximity to a person or repeatedly 
conveying verbal or written threats or threats implied by 
conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a 
person. 
(b) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, 
sibling, or any other person who regularly resides in the 
household or who regularly resided in the household 
within the prior six months. 
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions. 
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of 
conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a 
reasonable person: 
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of 
his immediate family; or 
(ii) to suffer emotional distress; 
(b) has knowledge or should have knowk 
specific person: 
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of i 
to himself or a member of his immediate 
(ii) will suffer emotional distress; anc 
(c) whose conduct: 
(i) induces fear in the specific pers 
injury to himself or a member of h: 
family, or 
(ii) causes emotional distress in the 
son. 
(3) Stalking is a class B misdemeanor. 
(4) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor if the of 
(a) has been previously convicted of an offe 
ing; 
(b) has been convicted in another jurisd 
offense that is substantially similar to tht 
stalking; or 
(c) has been previously convicted of any fe 
in Utah or of any crime in another jurisdict: 
committed in Utah would be a felony, in whici 
of the stalking was also a victim of the prei 
offense. 
(5) Stalking is a felony of the third degree if th 
(a) has been previously convicted two or m 
the offense of stalking; 
(b) has been convicted two or more times 
jurisdiction or jurisdictions of offenses that a 
tially similar to the offense of stalking; 
(c) has been convicted two or more tim 
combination, of offenses under Subsections (5 
or 
(d) has been previously convicted two or rac 
felony offenses in Utah or of crimes in another j 
or jurisdictions which, if committed in Utah 
felonies, in which the victim of the stalking 
victim of the previous felony offenses. 
76-5-107. Threat against life or property — I 
( D A person commits a threat against life or pro 
threatens to commit any offense involving violence \ 
to: 
(a) cause action of any nature by an official 01 
agency organized to deal with emergencies; 
(b) place a person in fear of imminent sen 
injury; or 
(c) prevent or interrupt the occupation of a I 
room; place of assembly; place to which the ! 
access; or aircraft, automobile, or other form ot 
tation. 
(2) A threat against life or property is a class 
meanor, except if the actor's intent is to prevent or 
the occupation of a building, a place to which the j 
access, or a facility of public transportation oper. 
common carrier, the offense is a third degree felony. 
76-5-107.5. Prohibition of "hazing" — Defin 
Penalties. 
(1) "Hazing" means any action or situation tha 
purpose of initiation, admission into, affiliation wit 
condition for continued membership in any organiz; 
(a) recklessly or intentionally endangers the ' 
physical health or safety of any person; 
(b) willfully destroys or removes public or pri^ 
erty; 
(c) involves any brutality of a physical natux 
whipping, beating, branding, forced calisthenics 
sure to the elements; 
(d) involves forced consumption of any fax 
drug, or other substance or any other forced 
